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Increased enforcement can lead crime to be displaced to alternative lawbreaking 
methods. In theory, crime displacement should respond positively to the size of profits 
threatened by enforcement. If enforcement displaces crime towards lawbreaking methods 
with lower variable costs, the overall crime rate need not fall. This paper examines a 
customs reform in the Philippines that raised enforcement against a specific method of 
avoiding import duties. The reform constituted a quasi-experiment: the increased 
enforcement applied only to shipments from a subset of countries, so that corresponding 
shipments from all other countries serve as a comparison group. Increased enforcement 
reduced the targeted method of duty avoidance, but led to substantial displacement to an 
alternative duty-avoidance method (shipping via duty-exempt export processing zones), 
amounting to 2.7 percent of total imports from treatment countries. The hypothesis that 
the reform led to zero change in total duty avoidance cannot be rejected. Displacement 
was greater for products with higher tariff rates and import volumes, consistent with the 
existence of fixed costs of switching to alternative duty-avoidance methods. 
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Economic theory posits that criminal activity arises from rational assessment of the costs and
beneﬁt so fl a w b r e a k i n g .I nt h ew a k eo fB e c k e r ’ s( 1 9 6 8 )e c o n o m i cm o d e lo fc r i m e ,t h e r eh a sb e e n
substantial interest in the economics of illegal activity (Ehrlich (1973), Witte (1980), Andreoni
(1991), Freeman (1996), among others). In particular, establishing the impact of law enforcement
on crime is central, and several papers have made important strides in this area (McCormick and
Tollison (1984), Levitt (1997), Corman and Mocan (2000), Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001), Di
Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), among others).
There has been a longstanding concern in crime studies that increased enforcement can lead
criminal activity to be displaced to alternative lawbreaking methods (Repetto (1976)). A simple
model predicts that, when alternative lawbreaking methods involve ﬁxed costs of entry, crime
displacement should respond positively to the size of illicit proﬁts threatened by enforcement.
But there is little empirical evidence on the relationship between crime displacement and basic
economic factors: for the most part, empirical analyses of enforcement’s impact have addressed
displacement as a mere sidenote, at most examining the existence or amount of displacement.1
Evidence on the determinants of crime displacement could shed light on the importance of eco-
nomic motives in the decisions of lawbreakers more generally.2
Moreover, existing studies typically conclude that displacement is a minor phenomenon, ﬁnd-
ing either no evidence of displacement or that it is small in magnitude.3 But in theory, increased
enforcement can actually backﬁre, leading crime rates to be unchanged or even to increase. This
perverse outcome can occur when alternative methods have higher ﬁxed costs but lower variable
costs than previously-used methods.
This paper is an empirical study of such unintended consequences of law enforcement, and
examines crime displacement in the context of customs reform in the Philippines. In 1990, the
Philippine government raised enforcement in customs against a speciﬁc method of avoiding im-
port duties. The reform constituted a quasi-experiment: the increased enforcement applied only
1See Chaiken, et al (1974), McPheters, et al (1984), Ayres and Levitt (1998), Levitt (1998), Braga, et al (1999),
and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), among others. See also Hesseling’s (1994) overview.
2A related line of research is the literature on marginal deterrence, which considers lawbreakers’ choices among
diﬀerent types of crimes (Stigler (1970)). Shavell (1992), Wilde (1992), and Mookherjee and Png (1994) examine
social welfare-maximizing punishment schedules for a set of diﬀerentially-harmful crimes.
3For example, DiNardo and Lemieux (2001) ﬁnd small amounts of displacement from alcohol to marijuana
consumption in response to increases in state-level drinking ages.
1to shipments from a subset of countries, so that corresponding shipments from all other countries
serve as a comparison group. Increased enforcement reduced the targeted method of duty avoid-
ance, but led to substantial displacement to an alternative duty-avoidance method (shipping via
duty-exempt export processing zones), amounting to 2.7 percent of total imports from treatment
countries. The hypothesis that the reform led to zero change in total duty avoidance cannot
be rejected. Displacement was greater for products with higher tariﬀ rates and import volumes,
consistent with the existence of ﬁxed costs of switching to alternative duty-avoidance methods.
While studying the impact of enforcement in customs can shed light on the economics of
crime displacement, it is also important for the public ﬁnances of nearly all developing countries.4
Smuggling5 and customs corruption are rife in many countries, and trade taxes are an important
source of government revenue.6 In 1995, import duties accounted for an average of 23% of central
government tax revenue among non-OECD developing countries, but the fraction was as high
as 31% in the Philippines, 32% in Cote d’Ivoire, and 37% in the Dominican Republic.7 Most
commonly, an importer under-reports the value of an incoming shipment so as to pay lower
import duties (a practice known as underinvoicing), and customs oﬃcials may agree to overlook
the fraudulent declaration in return for bribes. Government revenue ultimately suﬀers. Moreover,
a government having diﬃculty collecting trade taxes may have to resort to more distortionary
methods of public ﬁnance in the long term.
The Philippine customs reform examined in this paper is also of more general interest, as it
w a sa ne x a m p l eo fav e r yc o m m o na p p r o a c ht oﬁghting smuggling and customs corruption: hiring
private ﬁrms to conduct preshipment inspection of imports (known as PSI). When a government
implements a PSI program, foreign inspectors verify the tariﬀ classiﬁcation and value of indi-
4Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) appeal for research on the responses of tax evaders to greater enforcement.
5Following common usage in the customs ﬁeld, in this paper the term ‘smuggling’ refers to any illicit means
by which an importer reduces duties paid on a shipment, whether the shipment passes through formal customs
channels or avoids formal channels entirely.
6In the international trade context, existing research ﬁnds evidence of tax avoidance and evasion, but does
not examine the impact of enforcement on these activities. Pritchett and Sethi (1994) ﬁnd that collected import
duties as a share of import value rise less than one-for-one with the tariﬀ rate, and interpret this as evidence of
tax evasion/avoidance. Fisman and Wei (2004) ﬁnd that the extent of import underinvoicing rises in the tariﬀ
rate among Chinese imports from Hong Kong. A number of authors examine tax-induced transfer pricing within
multinational ﬁrms (Bernard and Weiner (1990), Hines and Rice (1994) and Clausing (1998), among others). In
the related realm of income tax evasion, Klepper and Nagin (1989) examine cross-sectional correlates of income
underreporting on speciﬁc line items of US tax returns.
7T h es o u r c eo ft h e s eﬁgures is World Development Indicators 2002.
2vidual incoming shipments before they leave their origin countries. In nearly all cases, however,
the responsibility for collecting customs duties remains in the hands of the importing country’s
customs oﬃcials, who may choose to ignore PSI reports on speciﬁc shipments. PSI programs can
fail to reduce import duty evasion if enforcers fail to use the new information available to them
in the PSI reports, or if importers can ﬁnd alternative methods of avoiding duties (that may
involve avoiding PSI, or bringing shipments into the country outside of formal customs channels
so that shipments never appear before a customs oﬃcer). The latter possibility–that importers
ﬁnd alternative duty-avoidance methods–is the focus of this paper. (See the Appendix for more
details on the functioning of preshipment inspection programs.)
A standard problem when assessing the impact of increased enforcement is establishing a
credible counterfactual, with which the causal impact of the new enforcement can be separated
from time trends in crime rates, from the impact of other simultaneous enforcement eﬀorts, or
from reverse causation (higher crime rates leading to more enforcement). To establish the causal
impact of increased enforcement, this paper takes advantage of the fact that–for the 28-month
period of interest–the Philippines’ PSI program only covered imports from a subset of countries.
Then, during the course of the study period, the Philippine government increased enforcement
against duty-avoidance for imports from PSI-covered countries, by expanding inspections to a
previously exempt shipment category (shipments below a certain dollar value). The key element of
the identiﬁcation strategy is the existence of a plausible control category–imports from countries
not covered by the Philippine PSI program–against which changes in imports from PSI countries
can be compared. The empirical analysis ﬁnds that when the Philippine government increased
enforcement by expanding inspections to low-value shipments, imports from treatment countries
shifted diﬀerentially to an alternative duty-avoidance method: shipping via duty-exempt export
processing zones.
Because changes over time in a treatment group are compared with corresponding changes
in a control group, this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence identiﬁcation strategy purges the empirical esti-
mates of time trends in the use of various duty-avoidance methods, as well as general changes
in customs enforcement that should aﬀect imports from all countries equally (such as changes in
legal sanctions against smugglers, salaries of customs oﬃcials, etc.). A possible remaining worry
concerns the endogeneity of treatment: certain countries might have been chosen to be included
in the Philippines’ PSI program because imports from these countries were expected to exhibit
the observed changes in the use of diﬀerent duty-avoidance methods (in other words, the observed
changes would have occurred even without the increased enforcement). While this possibility is
3diﬃcult to rule out directly, an indirect test does not raise such concerns: there is no evidence
of diﬀerential trends in the use of the diﬀerent duty-avoidance methods immediately prior to the
policy change of interest.8
Section 2 outlines a simple model of crime displacement, applied to import duty evasion
(smuggling). Section 3 presents empirical evidence on the economics of displacement in the
context of the Philippine PSI program. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix provides more detail
on the functioning of PSI programs generally, and on the calculation of the revenue loss to the
Philippine government due to the reform studied.
2 Crime displacement in theory
I describe here a simple model of the impact of enforcement on criminal activity, when enforcement
only targets a subset of methods by which a particular crime can be carried out. In this situation
we should expect crime to be displaced to the alternative, untargeted methods. The extent of
displacement to alternative lawbreaking methods depends on the relative ﬁxed and variable costs
of the diﬀerent methods, and on the size of illicit proﬁts that are threatened by enforcement.
Departing from standard crime models (such as Becker (1968)), I assume ﬁxed costs of using
particular lawbreaking methods. Enforcement can lead to no change (and even an increase)
in the crime rate when enforcement targets just one of several methods of lawbreaking (the one
lawbreakers currently use), and when the alternative methods have lower variable costs but higher
ﬁxed costs than the original method. Higher ﬁx e dc o s t sc a nm a k el a w b r e a k i n gl e s sp r o ﬁtable for
criminals when they use an alternative method, even if they are committing more crime overall.
Prior to the increase in enforcement, lawbreakers may refrain from using the lower-variable-cost
methods because they have higher ﬁxed costs (and thus lower proﬁtability). An enforcement
eﬀort can then encourage lawbreakers to bear the ﬁxed cost of entry into new, lower-variable-cost
lawbreaking methods, so that the amount of illegal activity actually increases.9
To keep the discussion concrete, I focus on the example of enforcement against import duty
evasion, but it should be clear that the logic can apply to enforcement against other crimes whose
methods have similar relative cost structures. Crucially, preshipment inspection targets smuggling
methods that are usually not the only possible methods of avoiding import duties, and so leaves
8Section 3.6 below describes the results of this ‘false experiment’.
9This ﬁnding is reminiscent of the possible perverse impact of managerial incentives in the multi-task principal-
agent problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Prendergast (2000)).
4open the possibility of displacement.
Consider an importer choosing between smuggling methods 1 and 2, each of which has distinct
ﬁxed and variable costs. Fixed costs include the costs of falsifying documentation, of ﬁnding and
maintaining suppliers willing to collude in smuggling, or of setting up and maintaining smug-
gling facilities (like front companies). Bribes paid to government oﬃcials may also have ﬁxed
components. Variable costs include legal penalties, which rise in expectation if the likelihood
of detection increases in the amount smuggled. In addition, legal penalties themselves may be
a function of the value of smuggled goods, particularly if oﬀending shipments are conﬁscated.
Bribes paid could also rise in the amount smuggled because facilitating the smuggling of larger
shipments is riskier for the bribe-takers.
Assume for simplicity that many identical ﬁrms each inelastically import a ﬁxed amount M
(say that they face capacity constraints). Thei m p o r t e rm u s td e c i d ew h i c ho ft h et w os m u g -
gling methods to use; without loss of generality, assume that method one is the initially-chosen
method.10 The importer chooses the smuggling rate γ1, the fraction smuggled out of total imports.
Let the net beneﬁt of using smuggling method 1 (B1)b ea sf o l l o w s :
B1 ≡ τMγ1 − v1γ
2
1 − F1 (1)
τ is the tariﬀ rate per unit of imports. τMγ1 is therefore the value of tariﬀsa v o i d e dv i a
smuggling. Smuggling costs are convex–assumed here to rise in the square of the smuggling rate–
and are parameterized by v1. F1 is the ﬁxed cost of smuggling method 1. Convex smuggling costs
could arise if the authorities devoted more eﬀort to apprehending large smugglers than smaller
ones. Alternately, it could become increasingly diﬃcult to hide evidence of smuggling when the
total amount of smuggling is large.
The curve labeled B1 in Figure 1 displays the net beneﬁt for smuggling method 1 as a function
of the smuggling rate. The importer chooses a smuggling rate γ∗
1,t h em a x i m u mp o i n to nt h en e t







The government can increase enforcement on a smuggling method by raising the costs (either
ﬁxed or variable) of that method. Say that the government implements an anti-smuggling program
(like PSI) that targets just smuggling method 1, raising its variable cost parameter v1.I f t h e
importer is constrained to only use method 1, an increase in v1 must lead an optimizing importer
10I assume here that the importer only chooses to use one smuggling method, never both simultaneously.
5to choose a lower smuggling rate. Graphically in Figure 1, an increase in v1 shifts the net beneﬁt
curve downwards and to the left (from B1 to B0
1).
But the importer will not continue using smuggling method 1. The importer also has access
to smuggling method 2, with net beneﬁt function B2 in Figure 1. Before the rise in v1,m e t h o d
1 was the preferred smuggling method, because the peak of curve B1 was above that of B2.B u t
the peak of B0
1 is lower than the peak of B2, so the importer switches to smuggling method 2,
with optimal smuggling rate γ∗
2. In the case depicted, the smuggling rate rises (γ∗
2 >γ ∗
1).
Intuitively, for the smuggling rate to rise after the switch, smuggling method 2 must have a
lower variable cost parameter than method 1 (v2 <v 1). For the importer to have chosen method
1 over method 2 initially, method 2 must have a higher ﬁxed cost (F2 >F 1), so that smuggling
method 1 was initially more proﬁtable overall. Of course, a switch in smuggling methods does
not necessarily lead to a higher smuggling rate. Smuggling method 2 could have higher variable
costs, so that the smuggling rate would fall even with a switch of smuggling methods (in this
case, the peak of curve B2 would be to the left of γ∗
1 in Figure 1).11
Of course, an importer may not always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to switch to an alternative smuggling
method. What determines whether an importer will choose to switch smuggling methods in
response to increased enforcement? The expressions for the net beneﬁt from smuggling (equation
(1)) and for the optimal smuggling rate (equation (2)) can be used to write the net beneﬁtf r o m


















This inequality provides a very simple and intuitive condition for displacement to method 2 to
be proﬁtable for an importer: total tariﬀs on one’s imports (τM) must exceed a certain threshold
11The simple model presented here assumes away elements that are easy to consider. A fuller model of smuggling
displacement is available from the author on request. The basic conclusion–that the smuggling rate can either
rise or fall in response to targeted enforcement–holds when assuming a more general functional form for the




v2F2 (determined by the enforcement parameter and the ﬁxed cost of using the alternative
method).
The implication of this inequality for the empirical analysis to follow is straightforward. Let
there be an increase in enforcement against a speciﬁc smuggling method, and let dh be displace-
ment of imports of a certain product h to an alternative method in response to an increase in
enforcement. Displacement to an alternative method should rise in the tariﬀ rate τ and in the







In addition, the fact that displacement occurs as long as τMh exceeds a certain threshold
means that the impact of increases in the tariﬀ rate on displacement will matter less when import






These predictions as to the determinants of the amount of displacement will be tested in the
empirical analysis to follow.
3 Smuggling displacement in the Philippines
This section documents that in response to increased enforcement on a speciﬁc smuggling method,
Philippine importers shifted dramatically to an alternative method of avoiding import duties:
shipping via export processing zones. As predicted by theory, displacement is greater when the
size of proﬁts from displacement (proxied by the tariﬀ rate and import volume at the level of the
product group) are higher. The amount of displacement was so large that I cannot reject that
the overall fraction of imports in shipment categories amenable to import duty avoidance was
unchanged after the reform.
I focus on a 28-month period in the Philippine PSI program during which preshipment in-
spections were only required for imports from a subset of origin countries. Over the course of
1990, the government made changes to the PSI program that made it harder to avoid PSI using
a previously-exploited exemption. I ask whether shipments from countries requiring PSI subse-
quently shifted to other methods of avoiding import duties. To account for potential changes over
time in the attractiveness of diﬀerent duty-avoidance methods, it is helpful that a comparison
group exists for which PSI was not required at all during the period of analysis.
7During the study period, between November 1989 and February 1992, PSI was only required
for imports from nine countries (Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). I use imports from countries not subject to PSI–all other
countries–as the comparison group during this period to identify the impact of the rule changes on
PSI-country imports. From now on, I will refer to the nine countries whose imports were included
in the program as the ‘treatment countries’, and all other countries as the ‘control countries’. I
take November 1989 as the beginning of the study period because six of the treatment countries
were newly added to the PSI program in the previous month.12 The end of the study period
is February 1992 because the PSI program was extended to cover all countries in the following
month (no control group exists after that date).13
I ng e n e r a l ,i tc a nb er e a s o n a b l ef o rag o v e r n m e n tt oe x e m p ts o m et y p e so ft a x a b l et r a n s a c t i o n s
from monitoring, if the expected gain from monitoring the transactions is small relative to mon-
itoring costs. At the beginning of the Philippine PSI program, a shipment from a PSI-covered
country was exempt from preshipment inspection if its declared f.o.b.14 value was less than
$5,000. However, an obvious drawback of exempting certain transactions from monitoring is that
exemptions may be exploited by tax evaders. In practice, smugglers did seek to take advantage
of the $5,000 threshold to avoid PSI, by simply declaring shipment values below that threshold.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the main approach was to split shipments into batches that
each could reasonably be declared as valued below $5,000. In addition, single shipments that
were somewhat above the threshold in actual value were simply underinvoiced to fall below the
threshold.
On two dates in 1990, the government took steps to remove this exemption. On May 2, 1990,
the government lowered the minimum value threshold to $2,500. Six months later, on November
1, 1990, the government further lowered the threshold to $500. In terms of the theoretical model,
these threshold reductions increased the variable cost of using a particular duty-avoidance method:
exploiting the minimum value threshold exemption. Packaging and freight costs become much
12The countries added to the program in October 1989 were Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South
Korea, and Thailand. The only change in country coverage during the study period was the inclusion of the
Portuguese enclave of Macau in the PSI program on May 2, 1990. For this reason, imports from Macau will
be excluded from the analysis. This exclusion is of very minor importance: recorded imports from Macau are
negligible, at just US$5.3 million over the entire period (0.02% of total imports).
13See Appendix Table 1 for a detailed description of changes in country coverage and minimum value thresholds
for the Philippine PSI program.
14The f.o.b., or ‘free-on-board,’ value of a shipment is its value excluding the costs of freight and insurance.
8more onerous when shipments are split into smaller batches. The strategy of simply underinvoicing
a single shipment to fall below the threshold also became more diﬃcult.15
The analysis shows that after the minimum value threshold was lowered, shipments from PSI
countries shifted dramatically to an alternative method of avoiding import duties. These shifts
were diﬀerential with respect to changes for shipments from non-PSI countries, helping conﬁrm
that the threshold reduction was the causal factor behind the shifts.
At the outset, it is important to address a potential alternative interpretation of the displace-
ment patterns: perhaps importers are not seeking to avoid import duties, but only seek to avoid
the transaction cost of the preshipment inspection. (The inspection fee is paid by the Philip-
pine government, so the transactions cost arises from a potential delay in the departure of the
shipment.) The empirical results in section 3.4 below provide evidence for the duty-avoidance
motivation: displacement across product groups is positively correlated with the tariﬀ rate, which
should not be the case if mere inspection-avoidance was the motivation behind the displacement.
3.1 Identifying shipment types amenable to smuggling
The empirical analysis uses data on individual shipments and their characteristics, obtained
from the National Statistics Oﬃce of the Philippines. The dataset contains information on each
shipment that entered the country via formal customs procedures. Prior to the present study,
these data had only been used to calculate aggregate Philippine import statistics.
After the reduction of the minimum value threshold to $500, what alternative methods of
duty avoidance were available to importers from PSI countries? Two other methods exist that
importers from PSI countries could have used to avoid the preshipment inspection, and thus
continue avoiding import duties. The methods are:
1. Valuing shipments below the new minimum value threshold, $500.
2. Importing shipments via an export processing zone. Export processing zones are government-
created geographic areas into which licensed manufacturing enterprises can import raw
materials and intermediate inputs without payment of duties. To encourage investment
in government-sponsored export processing zones, imports required by enterprises in the
zones were also exempted from the preshipment inspection requirement. Such zones could
15Grossly undervalued shipments also would have been much more likely to catch the attention of domestic
customs oﬃcers, even if they escaped the PSI requirement.
9have been used as a conduit for smuggling: zone imports could simply be diverted into the
domestic market.
The empirical analysis will gauge the extent to which shipments from PSI countries shift
towards these alternative methods in response to the reduction in the minimum value threshold.
(Of course, there are other ways to avoid import duties which I cannot observe, so that I am likely
to be understating total actual displacement.) Note that some of the activities to which importers
switch after the increase in enforcement may include technically legal methods of avoiding import
duties. For example, an export manufacturer originally located outside an export processing zone
might have been smuggling via the minimum value threshold exemption, to reduce its import duty
payments on imported raw materials. The threshold reduction might have encouraged the ﬁrm
to bear the ﬁxed costs of relocating to the export processing zone; it would then have been legally
exempt from import duties on its imported raw materials. This would be a case of displacement
from illegal smuggling (via the minimum value threshold exemption) to legal tax avoidance.
In sum, therefore, the empirical analysis will track changes in the frequency of the following
shipment types from both PSI and non-PSI countries:
1. Shipments valued between $5,000 and $500
2. Shipments valued under $500
3. Shipments destined for export processing zones
The declared f.o.b. value of each shipment is reported (in nominal US dollars), and this
information is used to determine whether a shipment falls into one of the ﬁrst two listed categories.
The dataset also indicates whether a shipment is destined for an export processing zone.16
It is important to note that the smuggling method targeted for increased enforcement, and
the export processing zone method, qualitatively meet the conditions in the model under which
displacement could be large. The increase in enforcement targeted the minimum value threshold
loophole, a smuggling method likely to be characterized by low (but not necessarily zero) ﬁxed
costs: such costs would consist of convincing overseas suppliers to split shipments into smaller
16The analysis will track displacement from the ﬁrst shipment type to the other two on the list, and so it is
important to avoid double-counting of shipments. As it turns out, though, exceedingly few shipments to export
processing zones also fall into one of the low-value categories (0.02% of imports by value). I therefore simply
allocate such overlapping shipments to the relevant low-value type (either ‘between $5000 and $500’ or ‘under
$500’). The results are not sensitive to allocating these shipments to the export processing zone category instead.
10batches, or of ﬁnding an overseas supplier willing to do so. However, the method entailed non-
trivial variable costs. Per-unit packaging and documentation costs are high when shipments must
be split into small batches. Alert customs oﬃcers may also be more likely to notice when large
numbers of identical small shipments are brought in by the same importer.
By contrast, shipping to export processing zones is likely to have been characterized by high
ﬁxed but low variable costs, as it is a privilege granted only to government-authorized ﬁrms. So
importers seeking to smuggle via export processing zones may have had to establish and maintain
presences in the zones, or ﬁnd ﬁrms already in the zones willing to import on their behalf. Either
option is likely to have entailed signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs. However, having established an avenue for
shipping into export processing zones, importers to the zones should have faced considerably lower
variable costs. Shipments to export processing zones are duty-free, so that customs inspections
should have been perfunctory at best. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the borders of the zones
were poorly policed, so that goods brought into the zones easily found their way into the domestic
market.
3.2 Summary statistics and ﬁgures
The essence of the empirical results emerges in simple summary statistics and graphs for imports
from treatment and control countries. Figure 2 displays the fraction of total imports entering the
Philippines in shipments with declared values equal to or above $2,500 but below $5,000. The
solid line is the fraction for treatment countries, while the dotted line is for control countries. The
most striking aspect of this graph is the decline in the fraction of total imports in this value range
for treatment countries after May 1990, just as the minimum value threshold for PSI was lowered
from $5,000 to $2,500. By contrast, the fraction of total imports from control countries declared
to be in this value range displays no similar change during these months. The explanation for
these diﬀerential patterns is quite certain: prior to May 1990, some fraction of imports from PSI
countries were being intentionally declared as valued in this range to avoid the PSI requirement.
When the minimum value threshold was lowered to $2,500, this practice ceased.
Figure 3 displays the fraction of total imports entering in shipments with declared values equal
to or above $500 but below $2,500, for treatment countries compared to control countries. The
diﬀerential changes suggest that importers of goods from treatment countries modiﬁed their PSI-
avoidance strategies: the fraction of imports from treatment countries entering in this value range
increases sharply when the minimum value threshold for PSI is lowered to $2,500 in May 1990,
11and declines just as sharply when the threshold is lowered further to $500 in November 1990.
These changes on the part of imports from treatment countries are not mirrored by changes in
control countries.
The empirical analysis that follows focuses on changes before and after the May to November
1990 transitional period, so it makes sense to simply focus on shipments valued between $500
and $5,000 (the combination of the shipments in Figures 2 and 3). Table 1 presents summary
import statistics by shipment type and country group, for the before and after periods used in the
empirical analysis to follow. Shipments valued between $5,000 and $500 accounted for 5.1% of
treatment country imports, and 1.9% of control country imports during the ‘before’ period. In the
‘after’ period, by which time the minimum value threshold had been lowered to $500, shipments
in this value range accounted for just 3.7% of treatment country imports, while the percentage
in this value range for control countries stayed essentially constant; treatment country imports of
this type therefore declined diﬀerentially by 1.4 percentage points.
Once the minimum value threshold for PSI is lowered to $500 in November 1990, it is sensible
to check for a corresponding diﬀerential increase in the fraction of total imports from treatment
countries entering under that threshold. Figure 4 displays the fraction of total imports entering
in shipments with declared values below $500 for both groups of countries. While the fraction of
total imports under $500 from treatment countries seems to rise somewhat after November 1990,
this change is not obviously diﬀerential with respect to imports from control countries. Table 1
also indicates that the fraction of shipments entering in this category was very small both before
and after the reform, and so not likely to be an important area of displacement.
Figure 5 displays the fraction of total imports from the two country groups that are destined
for export processing zones. A diﬀerential increase in export processing zone shipments from
treatment countries is apparent, suggesting that importers from these countries may have been
encouraged to take advantage of the PSI exemption for export processing zone shipments as the
minimum value threshold was lowered. Table 1 indicates that shipments to export processing
zones accounted for 4.9% of treatment country imports, and 5.2% of control country imports
during the ‘before’ period. In the ‘after’ period, shipments of this type accounted for 9.1% of
treatment country imports; by contrast, the percentage in this value range for control countries
had risen only slightly, to 5.7%. The diﬀerential increase for treatment countries was therefore
3.7 percentage points.
Table 1 also indicates that total import volumes were roughly similar for both treatment and
control groups in the before and after periods. In the before period, the total value of imports
12from treatment and control countries were roughly similar: $2.3 billion for treatment countries,
and $3.1 billion for control countries, and both grow by between $5-6 billion through the (longer)
after period. (While treatment imports appear to grow by somewhat more than control imports
in proportional terms, the regression estimates in Section 3.5 reveal no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the overall growth rate of treatment and control imports.)
The summary statistics in Table 1, combined with Figures 2-5, provide the ﬁrst indication
that the minimum value threshold reductions led to substantial displacement to an alternative
duty-avoidance method, shipping via export processing zones. The following sections make the
same point via regression analysis, and additionally examine heterogeneity in displacement across
product groups related to tariﬀ rates and import volumes.
3.3 Empirical estimates
I estimate the following linear probability model for each of three shipment types separately,
as well as a category for ‘any of the three shipment types’ that allow avoidance of preshipment
inspection.17
Consider the probability that imports from country g and product group h enter the country as
shipment type j during period p, denoted P
j
ghp. I will consider two time periods: the ‘before period’
(November 1989 - April 1990), during which the minimum value threshold for PSI inspection
was $5,000, and the ‘after period’ (December 1990 - February 1992), when the minimum value
threshold was $500.18
The simplest diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the impact of the treatment (the reduction
17It may seem natural to model the choice among shipment types in the context of an empirical choice model
such as multinomial logit. But in this context, there is no gain to multinomial logit estimation over a linear prob-
ability model, because the linear probability model and multinomial logit provide identical predicted probabilities
when estimating a saturated model (where right-hand-side variables are mutually-exclusive dummy variables).
Independent variables for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation in fact provide a saturated model: right-hand-side
regressors provide the predicted probabilities in mutually-exclusive categories (PSI shipments in the before period,
non-PSI shipments in the before period, PSI shipments in the after period, and non-PSI shipments in the after
period). There is also no gain to estimating binomial logit or probit models for the shipment types separately,
because these also generate exactly identical predicted probabilities as the linear probability model in the saturated
case.
18Changes in PSI rules apply for shipments whose letters of credit are opened after the rule change, and the
arrival date in the country could be some weeks later. Therefore, shipments arriving during the month when
the threshold was ﬁrst lowered to $500 may not yet have been subject to the new PSI rules. I therefore exclude
November 1990 from the ‘after period’.
13of the minimum value threshold) on the probability that a shipment enters as shipment type j,
P
j














Time-invariant country group eﬀects are accounted for: TREATMENTgh is a country group
dummy, taking a value of 1 if a shipment is declared as originating in a PSI country, and 0 oth-
erwise. The corresponding ﬁxed eﬀect for shipments originating in non-PSI countries is captured
in the constant term, β
j
0. The change between the before and after periods common to shipments
from all countries is accounted for via the inclusion of AFTERp, the indicator for the after period.
The diﬀerential change since the before period in the probability of shipments of type j for PSI
countries is captured in the interaction term between the treatment indicator (TREATMENTgh)
and the indicator for the after period. ε
j
ghp is a mean-zero error term.
The coeﬃcient of interest will be β
j
1,t h ed i ﬀerential change for shipments from treatment
countries in the likelihood of observing shipment type j, in response to a change in the enforcement
environment (the reduction of the minimum value threshold) that makes it more diﬃcult to
smuggle by valuing a shipment between $500 and $5,000. The identiﬁcation assumption is that
without the minimum value threshold reduction, changes in the observed frequency of particular
s h i p m e n tt y p e so v e rt i m ew o u l dh a v eb e e nt h es a m ef o ri m p o r t sf r o mt r e a t m e n ta n dc o n t r o l
countries.
For each potential method of duty avoidance, I estimate weighted least squares regressions as
in equation (4), where the dependent variable is the fraction of the total value of imports entering
as the shipment type in question. The unit of observation is imports in a country/product-group
cell in a certain month; product groups are the 21 Harmonized System (version 1988) sections.
Each observation is weighted by mean monthly imports (by value) in before period (Nov 1989 to
Apr 1990) for the country/product-group cell, so that coeﬃcients can be interpreted as reﬂecting
the probability that a particular dollar of imports falls into a certain category. It is possible that
error terms in equation (4) may be serially correlated among observations from the same country,
so I calculate standard errors clustered by country.
Because the reduction in the minimum value threshold to $500 makes it more diﬃcult to evade
duties on shipments valued above that threshold, we should expect that when the shipment type
in question is ‘shipments valued between $5000 and $500’, β
j
1 < 0 (that shipment type should
become diﬀerentially less common). If displacement occurs to alternative duty-avoidance methods
associated with the other shipment types, we should expect that β
j
1 > 0 for the other shipment
14types (those shipment types should become diﬀerentially more common). These predictions are
b o r n eo u ti nt h er e s u l t s .
Table 2, Panel A presents the regression results from estimation of equation (4); each column
contains coeﬃcients and standard errors for a speciﬁcs h i p m e n tt y p ej. The second row of the
t a b l ed i s p l a y sc o e ﬃcients on the treatment group indicator (β
j
2), and the third row the coeﬃcient
on the after indicator (β
j
3).
The coeﬃcients of interest are in the ﬁrst row, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the
treatment dummy and the after indicator (β
j
1), which represent the diﬀerential change between
the before period and the after period in the likelihood that a dollar of imports from a treatment
country entered via shipment type j. The null hypothesis is that imports from treatment countries
do not shift among shipment types in response to the minimum value threshold reduction in a
manner diﬀerent from control-country imports. If this were true, we should ﬁnd that β
j
1 is not
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for any of the three shipment types.
In the ﬁrst regression, the negative coeﬃcient on (Treatment country)*(After) indicates that
between the before period and the after period it became diﬀerentially less likely that a dollar
of imports from a treatment country entered in a shipment valued between $5,000 and $500.
This change is highly statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, providing strong evidence that
the additional inspection requirement for low-value shipments discouraged importers from using
duty-avoidance methods involving valuation in this value range. A dollar of imports from PSI
countries became 1.7 percentage points diﬀerentially less likely to be in a shipment valued between
$5,000 and $500 between the before and after periods.
The positive coeﬃcients on (Treatment country)*(After) in the following two regressions sug-
gest that importers from PSI countries switched to alternative methods of duty avoidance in
response to the minimum value threshold reductions. In the regression where the fraction of
imports destined for export processing zones is the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient is statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. A dollar of imports from a treatment country became 2.7
percentage points diﬀerentially more likely to be in a shipment destined for an export processing
zone between the before and after periods.
The coeﬃcient on the (Treatment country)*(After) variable in the last column of the table
(representing the change in the net use of all three potential methods of duty avoidance) is not
statistically signiﬁcant, although it is positive in sign. I simply conclude that I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the combined use of all three methods of avoiding import duties was
unchanged in response to the minimum value threshold reduction.
15The results of Panel A, Table 2 are for the simplest possible diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of
the impact of the minimum value threshold reductions. A potential worry might be that simply
capturing time-invariant heterogeneity across treatment and control imports with the ‘Treatment
country’ indicator is too crude; for example, one could imagine that changes in the fractions of
imports in the diﬀerent shipment categories might simply reﬂect a change in the composition of
imports (at the country or product level) within the treatment and control groups over time.







1 (TREATMENT gh ∗ AFTERp)+γgh + θp + ε
j
ghp (5)
where γgh denotes ﬁxed eﬀects for the country/product-group cell (of which there are 740),
and θp denotes ﬁxed eﬀe c t sf o rt h em o n t h( o fw h i c ht h e r ea r e2 1 ) .
Panel B of Table 2 presents coeﬃcient estimates on the (Treatment country)*(After) vari-
able, corresponding to those in Panel A. The coeﬃcients are essentially the same as those in
Panel A, and attain similar levels of statistical signiﬁcance. The fact that the results are essen-
tially unchanged after the inclusion of country/product-group ﬁxed eﬀects provides no reason to
worry that changes in the composition of imports might be behind these diﬀerential shifts across
shipment types over time.
An alternative estimate of the treatment eﬀect of the minimum value threshold reduction can
be obtained when the unit of analysis is taken to be all imports from a particular country in a
particular month (disregarding information on product group). Such estimates are presented in
Appendix Table 2 (in a format that parallels that of Table 2). Aside from the change in unit
of analysis, the country/product-group ﬁxed eﬀects in Panel B are replaced by simple country
ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients in Appendix Table 2 on the (Treatment country)*(After) term in
columns (a) and (c) are of the same signs and levels of statistical signiﬁcance as those in Table
2. The main diﬀerence is that each coeﬃcient of interest is slightly larger in absolute value.
Country/product-group ﬁxed eﬀects are substantially more conservative than mere country
ﬁxed eﬀects. So in all analyses to follow, I return to the speciﬁcation where the analysis is
conducted at the country/product-group level.
3.4 Displacement, tariﬀs, and import volumes
The above results describe average displacement across all products. The model of smuggling
displacement makes predictions as to the relationship between the amount of displacement, on
16the one hand, and a product’s tariﬀ rate and import volume on the other. This subsection thus
examines how the magnitude of displacement to alternative methods diﬀers according to these
characteristics. In addition, testing whether displacement responds to the tariﬀ rate can help
conﬁrm that the shifts are being motivated by avoidance of import duties (and not merely by
avoidance of the preshipment inspection itself).
When the government makes it more diﬃcult to exploit the minimum value threshold, im-
porters can either cease smuggling or switch to an alternative method. As discussed in section 2
above, we should expect more displacement for products with higher tariﬀs( τ) and higher import
volumes, and that the impact of tariﬀs( i m p o r tv o l u m e )o nd i s p l a c e m e n ts h o u l db el o w e rw h e n
import volume (tariﬀs) is already high: the cross-partial derivative should be negative.







1 (TREATMENTgh ∗ AFTERp)
+α
j
2 (τh ∗ TREATMENTgh ∗ AFTERp)+α
j
3 (lnMh ∗ TREATMENT gh ∗ AFTERp)
+α
j
4 (τh ∗ lnMh ∗ TREATMENTgh ∗ AFTERp)
+α
j
5 (τh ∗ AFTERp)+α
j
6 (lnMh ∗ AFTERp)
+α
j
7 (τh ∗ lnMh ∗ AFTERp)
+γgh + θp + ε
j
ghp (6)
τh is a tariﬀ rate for product group h,a n dlnMh is the log of import volume for that product
group. The coeﬃcients of interest are those on the interaction terms between τh, lnMh,a n d







Interactions between τh, lnMh,a n dτh ∗ lnMh and AFTERp are also included, to account for
changes over time in the frequency of various shipment types that may be associated with a
product’s tariﬀ rate or import volume.19
Ad i ﬃculty with working with tariﬀ data is that importers may be able to misdeclare the
product category of a shipment to take advantage of a lower tariﬀ rate. To take an extreme
example, imagine that only honest importers ever declare that they are importing high-tariﬀ
products, while dishonest importers shift among smuggling methods so that they can always
declare that they only import low-tariﬀ products. We might then observe more displacement
occurring for low-tariﬀ than for high-tariﬀ products, even if the products being displaced were in
19It is not necessary to include interactions with TREATMENTgh in the regression, because these would be
absorbed by the country/product-group ﬁxed eﬀects, γgh.
17reality high-tariﬀ products.
On the other hand, importers are unlikely to be able to misdeclare the contents of their
shipments across very aggregated product categories. They might be able, for example, to misde-
clare that a certain shipment of high-quality (and high-tariﬀ) textiles actually contained another
type of low-quality, low-tariﬀ cloth, but would have diﬃculty claiming the shipment contained
lower-tariﬀ chemicals or machinery.
I therefore work with tariﬀ rates and product groups at a relatively high level of aggregation:
Harmonized System (version 1988) sections, of which there are 21. The tariﬀ variable τh in
equation (6) is the simple average 1989 tariﬀ rate across all individual items within the HS 1988
section.
While the import volume that is relevant in the theoretical discussion above is at the level
of the individual importer, importer-level data is unfortunately not available. Therefore I simply
proxy importer-level trade volumes for a given product with the overall import volume of said
product. The import volume variable Mh is also at the HS section level, and is the log of mean
monthly imports in the ‘before’ period in the HS 1988 section.20
Table 3 presents characteristics of the HS 1988 product groups. The mean of Mh across the
product groups is $43.02 million, ranging from a low of $0.24 million for ‘arms and ammunition...’
(HS 19) to a high of $243 million for ‘machinery, mechanical appliances...’ (HS 16). The mean
and standard deviation of lnMh are 16.39 and 1.86, respectively. The mean of τh across the
product groups is 31.28, ranging from a low of 14.75 ‘mineral products’ (HS 5) to a high of 48.89
for ‘arms and ammunition...’ (HS 19).
Coeﬃcients from estimation of equation (6) are presented in Table 4. Focus ﬁrst on the results





3 should be positive, reﬂecting the fact that higher tariﬀs and higher import
v o l u m e ss h o u l dm a k ei tm o r ea t t r a c t i v et od i s p l a c es h i p m e n t st oa l t e r n a t i v em e t h o d so fd u t y
avoidance; in addition, the fact that the decision to displace simply requires that potential evaded
tariﬀs be above a certain threshold indicates that the cross-partial derivative of displacement
should be negative (α
j
4 should be negative). These predictions turn out to be exactly right: the
coeﬃcients on τh ∗ TREATMENT gh ∗ AFTERp and lnMh ∗ TREATMENTgh ∗ AFTERp are
both positive, and the coeﬃcient on τh∗lnMh∗TREATMENTgh∗AFTERp is negative; all are
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels.
20Both the tariﬀ rate and the import volume are as measured prior to the ‘after’ period to avoid confounding
the empirical estimates via possible endogeneity of these variables with respect to the treatment of interest.
18These estimates imply that for a product group such as HS 10, ‘Pulp; paper, paperboard, and
articles thereof’ (whose lnMh is 16.74, near the mean across product groups), a tariﬀ rate increase
of 10 percentage points from its previous level would have led to an increase in displacement to
export processing zones amounting to 1.6 percentage points of total imports.
It is now of interest to turn to the results for shipments valued between $5,000 and $500, in
column (a). The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are of opposite signs as the respective coeﬃ-
cients for export processing zone shipments, in column (c); all are highly statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. This pattern is sensible, and supports the notion that displacement is occuring
out of shipments valued between $5,000 and $500, and into shipments to export processing zones.
These results indicate that, prior to the reduction in the minimum value threshold, the products
that were most likely to be valued below $5,000 to avoid the preshipment inspection were those
with high tariﬀs or high import volumes (but that the impact of either of these variables singly
was lower the higher the level of the other variable). Once the minimum value threshold was
lowered, importers shifted these same products out of the ‘valuation between $5,000 and $500’
method of duty avoidance and into duty avoidance methods that involved shipping via export
processing zones.
3.5 Impact on total imports
An outcome of potential interest (and one that is in a sense more fundamental than the dependent
variables of Tables 2-4) is the total value of imports originating in treatment and control countries.
It makes sense to examine this outcome for two reasons. First, increased enforcement in the form
of a reduction in the minimum value threshold could discourage imports from treatment countries,
and lead traders to import from control countries instead. Second, the minimum value threshold
reduction also creates incentives to misreport the origin of shipments: importers from treatment
countries might ﬁnd ways to make it appear that their shipments actually originated from control
countries.
Both these types of responses to the minimum value threshold reduction would lead the ob-
served total value of imports to decline diﬀerentially for treatment countries with respect to
control countries. Appendix Table 3 examines whether there is any evidence for such a diﬀer-
ential change. In column (a) of the table, the regression is analogous to those in Panel A of
Table 2, with the diﬀerence that the outcome is the natural log of the total value of imports in
the country/product-group cell in a given month. In column (b) of the table, the regression is
19analogous to those in Panel B of Table 2, and the outcome is again the natural log of imports.
The regression results provide no indication that import volumes declined diﬀerentially due to
the minimum value threshold reduction: the coeﬃcient on the (Treatment country)*(After) vari-
able is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (and the coeﬃcient is actually positive in
sign). There is therefore no evidence that the country origins of Philippine imports changed due
to the reform (whether due to misreporting or true shifting of import sources). Displacement to
shipping via export processing zones may have provided importers from treatment countries suf-
ﬁcient opportunity to preserve the illicit proﬁts of duty avoidance, so that it was not additionally
necessary to source imports from elsewhere or to misreport the source countries of imports.
3.6 Test for pre-existing diﬀerential trends
Interpreting the diﬀerential changes just described as being due to the PSI minimum value thresh-
old reductions requires an identiﬁcation assumption: that, in the absence of the changes in the
minimum value thresholds, the changes in the frequencies of the shipment types would have been
identical for shipments from treatment and control countries. While this parallel-trend assump-
tion is impossible to test directly, a partial test is possible: I test for the existence of analogous
changes in the frequency of the diﬀerent shipment types before the reform actually occurred.
In this ‘false experiment’, I estimate regressions analogous to those in Table 2, but where the
‘before’ period refers to November 1988 to April 1989, and the after period refers to November
1989 to April 1990. Appendix Table 4 presents the regression results. There is no evidence of
shifts to alternative duty-avoidance methods corresponding to those found in the actual period
of analysis: the coeﬃcients on the (Treatment country)*(After) variable are small and not sta-
tistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. (Figures 2 through 5 also provide no indication of the
existence of pre-existing trends.) There is also no pre-existing diﬀerential trend in the total value
of imports from treatment and control countries (last column of Appendix Table 4).
3.7 Implications for Philippine government revenue
Conservative estimates of tariﬀ revenue gains and losses (net of PSI fees) suggest that the min-
imum value threshold reductions were a starkly uneconomic proposition, leading to signiﬁcant
losses in net revenue for the Philippine government. Table 5 presents estimates of revenue gains
and losses from the threshold reductions in the after period (December 1990 to February 1992);
see Appendix Section 5.2 for details of the calculations.
20The minimum value threshold reductions led to two types of revenue gains. First, because
importers were no longer able to avoid the PSI requirement by valuing shipments between $5,000
and $500, import duty collections should have increased on shipments that would not have been
inspected before. Second, shipments were not subject to PSI (thus saving inspection fees) if they
were shifted to valuation under $500 or to export processing zones. I estimate that total revenue
gains from these two sources amounted to roughly $24.6 million.
These revenue gains were considerably overshadowed by two kinds of costs to the Philippine
government. First, additional inspections of shipments valued between $500 and $5,000 would
have amounted to $28.0 million. Second, losses in import duties due to shifts to the other methods
of duty avoidance would have totaled $33.3 million.
These gross revenue losses balanced against gross revenue gains imply that the minimum value
threshold reductions led to a net loss of $36.8 million for the Philippine government. Given the
magnitude of the estimated gross losses relative to the gross gains, the overall conclusion should
be robust to relatively large changes in the assumptions used for the calculation.21
4C o n c l u s i o n
In a wide variety of contexts, governments seeking to discourage an undesirable activity face the
possibility that increased enforcement could simply push the activity to alternative channels. This
paper provides evidence that enforcement-induced crime displacement–as predicted by theory–
responds to the size of illicit proﬁts threatened by enforcement. In addition, it documents that
crime displacement can be very large, leading the amount of crime to be essentially unchanged
after the increase in enforcement.
Empirical evidence comes from an increase in enforcement in Philippine customs, in the context
of a widespread customs reform known as preshipment inspection (PSI). Identiﬁcation exploits
policies increasing enforcement (by requiring PSI) on only a subsets of imports, so that other
import categories serve as comparison groups. Increased enforcement on shipments from a subset
21While in retrospect the minimum value threshold reductions were clearly uneconomic from the standpoint
of raising import duties net of fees, it is not obvious that the Philippine government could have known this in
advance. At the time of the changes, Philippine customs was not computerized, the number of shipments in the
$500 to $5,000 value range might not have been known exactly, and so it might have been diﬃcult to estimate
the cost of the additional inspections. It was also unclear ex ante what fraction of shipments under $5,000 were
declared as being in that value range purely to avoid the PSI requirement. Finally, the large displacement to
export processing zones was probably unanticipated.
21of countries stimulated displacement to another observed duty-avoidance method, shipping to
export processing zones. Displacement was greatest for product groups with higher tariﬀsa n d
higher import volumes.
Import duty collection is not likely to be the only context in which crime displacement can be
substantial in the wake of increased enforcement. Collection of income taxes is the most obviously
related area. There are a number of ways to evade taxes–including hiring a crooked accountant,
setting up oﬀshore bank accounts, or shifting to economic activities that leave few documentary
traces–and many of these methods should involve high ﬁxed costs but low variable costs.
More generally, crimes that are carried out by organized groups may be especially suscep-
t i b l et od i s p l a c e m e n tt oh i g h - ﬁxed-cost methods, because such groups should be less liquidity-
constrained. Examples of such crimes may include political corruption, money laundering, illegal
gambling operations, or the illegal drug trade.22 Valuable future work could seek evidence–in
these and other crimes–of enforcement-induced displacement to high-ﬁxed-cost, low-variable-cost
lawbreaking methods.
5 Appendix
5.1 Description of preshipment inspection
PSI programs are typically initiated and supervised by a country’s ﬁnance ministry (or occasion-
ally its central bank), often upon the recommendation of multilateral funding institutions. When
governments institute PSI programs, importers are required to have their incoming shipments
inspected by a certiﬁed ﬁrm before they leave the country of origin. Importers inform the PSI
ﬁrm’s local oﬃce of the pending shipment, and the PSI ﬁrm arranges for its own or aﬃliated
agents in the origin country to inspect the shipment before departure.
Shipments are typically inspected at the premises of the exporting ﬁrm or at the port of depar-
ture. PSI ﬁrms assess the tariﬀ classiﬁcation, quantity, and total value of individual shipments,
and send their assessments to the client government. Many programs require that tamper-resistant
seals be placed on shipping containers after inspection. In nearly all PSI programs, the PSI ﬁrm
22In the drug trade, for example, more frequent searches of arriving passengers have discouraged smuggling via
single air travelers (a low-ﬁxed-cost, high-variable-cost method). An alternative method is shipping drugs within
20- or 40-foot shipping containers ﬁlled with a legal commodity used simply to conceal the illicit cargo (a high-
ﬁxed-cost, low-variable-cost method). For a discussion of displacement to alternative drug smuggling methods, see
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (2001, 2003) and Abt Associates (2001).
22does not collect the import duties; rather, actual duty collection remains the responsibility of
customs oﬃcials in the shipment’s destination country. Upon the shipment’s arrival in the desti-
nation country, the client government can use the PSI ﬁrm’s assessment to keep importers (and
potentially complicit customs oﬃcials) from misreporting the contents of shipments when they
pass through customs. It follows that PSI does not assist in collecting duties for shipments that
enter the destination country outside of formal customs channels (shipments ‘smuggled outright’).
While PSI clearly can be seen as a policy for combating certain types of smuggling and customs
corruption, it could also help facilitate the imports of honest importers by streamlining customs
clearance. A primary tactic used by corrupt customs oﬃcials to extract bribes from importers
is to delay the clearance of shipments from customs, often on the pretext that there is some
discrepancy between the customs declaration and the shipment’s actual contents. A preshipment
inspection generates independent information on the contents of a shipment that could increase
an honest importer’s bargaining power vis-a-vis a corrupt customs oﬃcer, potentially reducing
customs clearance times.23
Almost all PSI contracts specify that certain product categories and types of shipment are
exempt from the inspection requirement. Also, shipments below a minimum value threshold
are typically exempted from PSI. Data on the share of imports for which PSI is required is not
generally available, but when it has been reported the percentage is usually in the 80%-90% range
(see Rege 2001).
In return for their services, PSI ﬁrms typically charge a fee of about 1% of the value of
imports inspected, usually with a minimum charge per shipment in the realm of $250. The client
government pays the fee in most PSI programs, but in some countries importers pay the fee. In
the Philippine program, the government paid a fee of 0.6% of imports inspected, with a minimum
charge of $225 per shipment.
In 1985, Indonesia became the ﬁrst country to require preshipment inspection of imports
for customs purposes. The Philippine program followed soon afterwards, and was active from
April 1987 to March 2000. In total, over 50 developing countries have implemented customs PSI
programs for some period of time.24 As of mid-2002, such programs remained active in nearly 40
of these countries.
23Low (1995) (pp. 68-73) and Jenkins (1992) provide suggestive evidence along these lines. They cite survey
evidence that PSI was accompanied by dramatic reductions in customs clearance times in Indonesia.
24A small number of countries retain preshipment inspection ﬁrms to verify national quality or safety standards,
to help enforce foreign exchange restrictions, or for other non-customs purposes.
235.2 Calculation of impact on Philippine government revenue
This section outlines the details of the calculation of the change in Philippine import duty rev-
enue generated by the 1990 reduction in the PSI minimum value threshold, and the resulting
displacement to alternative methods of duty avoidance. Results of the calculations described here
are in Table 5, and the values of all parameters are at the bottom of Table 5.









1 is the coeﬃcient in the regression for valuation between $5,000 and $500 in Table
2, Mp is total imports from PSI countries during the after period, τ is the weighted average
tariﬀ rate, and 0.9 is the assumed fraction of true import values reported prior to the reform for
shipments in the $5,000 to $500 value range. The weights for calculation of the tariﬀ rate are HS
sections during the after period. Tariﬀ data is from 1992 UNCTAD Trains dataset (1991 data is
unavailable).










1 is the coeﬃcient in the regression for valuation under $500 in Table 2, and $500
is the assumed original value of each aﬀected shipment before it was shifted to valuation under
$500. ($500 is a lower bound on the actual original value of shipments shifted to valuation under
$500, so using $500 as the denominator here will overstate the original number of shipments
and the savings due to avoided inspections.) The term in parentheses is the inferred number of
shipments that were shifted to valuation under $500. $225 is the avoided inspection fee for each
such shipment.







1 is the coeﬃcient in the regression for export processing zones in Table 2, and η is the
PSI fee as a percentage of the declared value of an export processing zone shipment (0.77%).25
25η is calculated by inferring total PSI fees payable for all shipments to export processing zones during the after
period, taking into account the distribution of shipments by size and the PSI fee structure (0.6% of declared value,
with $225 minimum charge per shipment), and then dividing by the total value of shipments in the same period.
24Additional inspection fees for shipments valued between $500 and $5,000 are simply
N ∗ $225,
where N is the total number of shipments from PSI countries valued between $500 and $5,000
in the after period, and $225 is the inspection cost per shipment in that value range.







1 is the coeﬃcient in the regression for valuation under $500 in Table 2, and 0.1 is the
rate of underinvoicing (fraction of total shipment value unreported) importers are assumed to be
able to achieve.







1 is the coeﬃcient in the regression for export processing zones in Table 2. (This
expression is not multiplied by a rate of underinvoicing because all shipments to export processing
zones are exempt from import duties.)
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29Table 1: Philippine imports by shipment type and country group
Nov 1989 - Feb 1992
A. Treatment group imports
Before period After period Change
(Nov 1989 to (Nov 1990 to (After minus
Apr 1990) Feb 1992) before)
Total value of shipments (US$ millions) 2,310 7,390 5,080
Ln (Total value of shipments) 21.56 22.72 1.162
Percentage between $5000 and $500 5.07% 3.67% -1.40%
Percentage under $500 0.25% 0.30% 0.05%
Percentage destined for export processing zone 4.89% 9.09% 4.20%
B. Control group imports
Before period After period Change
(Nov 1989 to (Nov 1990 to (After minus
Apr 1990) Feb 1992) before)
Total value of shipments (US$ millions) 3,080 8,790 5,710
Ln (Total value of shipments) 21.85 22.90 1.050
Percentage between $5000 and $500 1.89% 1.92% 0.02%
Percentage under $500 0.11% 0.14% 0.03%
Percentage destined for export processing zone 5.24% 5.73% 0.49%
C. Difference-in-difference (treatment group change minus control group change)
Total value of shipments (US$ millions) -630
Ln (Total value of shipments) 0.112
Percentage between $5000 and $500 -1.42%
Percentage under $500 0.02%
Percentage destined for export processing zone 3.71%
NOTES-- Treatment group countries during the period of analysis are Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. All other countries are control countries. Shipments in overlapping 
shipment types (e.g., shipment is both "under $500" and "destined for export processing zone") are allocated to the 
low-value types (either "between $5000 and $500" or "under $500"). Data source:  shipment database of the National 
Statistics Office of the Philippines.
tables  summstatsTable 2: Displacement of treatment-country imports to alternative duty-avoidance methods
(Weighted least squares estimates)
Before period: Nov 1989 - Apr 1990. After period: Dec 1990 - Feb 1992.
A. Basic difference-in-difference estimate
…between $5000 
and $500
…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
(Treatment country)*(After) -0.017 0.0002 0.027 0.01
(0.006)*** (0.002) (0.010)** (0.013)
"Treatment country" indicator 0.03 0.0011 -0.002 0.029
(0.012)** (0.001) (0.013) (0.018)
"After" indicator 0.003 0.0023 0.002 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.026 0.0021 0.05 0.078
(0.004)*** (0.0003)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)***
R-squared 0.02 0 0.01 0.02
Number of observations 11,303 11,303 11,303 11,303
B. Detailed country/product-group and month fixed effects
…between $5000 
and $500
…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
(Treatment country)*(After) -0.016 0.0004 0.027 0.012
(0.006)*** (0.003) (0.010)*** (0.012)
Country/product-group fixed effects YYY Y
Month fixed effects YYY Y
R-squared 0.38 0.16 0.65 0.58
Number of observations 11,303 11,303 11,303 11,303
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Each column of table presents coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) in a separate weighted least squares regression. Standard errors 
clustered by country. Unit of observation is imports in a country/product-group cell in a given month. Data are monthly from Nov 1989 to Feb 1992 
(excluding May-Nov 1990 transition period). Dependent variables are fraction of a month's imports that fall into given category (e.g., fraction of imports 
destined for export processing zone). Independent variables in Panel B are fixed effects for each country/product-group combination and fixed effects for 
each time period (individual months). "After" indicates observation occurs in Dec 1990 or after. Each observation weighted by mean monthly imports (by 
value) in before period (Nov 1989 to Apr 1990) for the country/product-group. Product group is Harmonized System section.
During before period (Nov 1989 - Apr 1990), minimum value threshold for PSI inspection was $5,000. During after period (Dec 1990 - Feb 1992), 
minimum value threshold for PSI inspection was $500. Each category of shipments indicated is a potential method of avoiding import duties. Reduction 
in PSI minimum value threshold makes it more difficult to smuggle from treatment countries via shipments valued between $5,000 and $500. Avoiding 
import duties via valuation under $500 and via shipping to export processing zones is possible in both before and after periods. Treatment group (those 
whose shipments required PSI) is shipments from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Sample excludes shipments from Macau.
Dependent variable: Fraction of imports …
Dependent variable: Fraction of imports …















1 24.70 17.02 28.18 Live animals; animal products
2 42.20 17.56 36.02 Vegetable products
3 2.04 14.53 35.68 Animal or vegetable oils, fats, or waxes
4 28.60 17.17 40.97 Prepared foods, beverages, and tobacco
5 156.00 18.87 14.75 Mineral products (including oil and petroleum)
6 89.20 18.31 16.42 Chemicals and related products (pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, etc.)
7 40.90 17.53 27.89 Plastics, rubber, and articles thereof
8 5.41 15.50 32.02 Goods of leather or animal skin
9 3.41 15.04 31.22 Wood, cork, straw, and articles thereof
10 18.70 16.74 32.67 Pulp; paper, paperboard, and articles thereof
11 81.10 18.21 40.81 Textiles and textile articles
12 2.04 14.53 45.00 Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, walking sticks; articles of feathers, down or hair
13 6.09 15.62 35.26 Articles of stone, plaster, ceramics, glass, etc.
14 1.62 14.29 44.44 Pearls, precious or semiprecious stones, precious metals, jewelry, coin
15 73.20 18.11 21.76 Base metals and articles thereof
16 243.00 19.31 24.22 Machinery, mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; electronic appliances
17 65.30 17.99 25.50 Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment
18 16.10 16.59 19.41 Precision instruments and apparatus; timekeeping devices; musical instruments
19 0.24 12.37 48.89 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof
20 1.82 14.41 39.18 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
21 1.83 14.42 16.67 Works of art, antiques
Mean 43.02 16.39 31.28
Std. Dev. 60.93 1.86 10.06
NOTES-- Import volume variable is mean monthly imports in the before period in the Harmonized System (1988 version) section. "Before" period is 
Nov 1989 to Apr 1990. Tariff rate is simple average 1989 tariff across all individual items in the Harmonized System section.Table 4: Heterogeneity in impact of increased enforcement on treatment-country imports
(Weighted least squares estimates)
Before period: Nov 1989 - Apr 1990. After period: Dec 1990 - Feb 1992.
…between $5000 
and $500
…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
Right-hand-side variables:
(Treatment group)*(After) 0.6648 0.2495 -1.2506 -0.3363
(0.2442)*** (0.2072) (0.6085)** (0.5655)
Interactions with (Treatment group)*(After):
Tariff rate -0.0250 -0.0066 0.0384 0.0068
(0.0090)*** (0.0060) (0.0184)** (0.0179)
Log import volume -0.0375 -0.0135 0.0717 0.0208
(0.0133)*** (0.0111) (0.0338)** (0.0310)
(Tariff rate)*(Log import volume) 0.0014 0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0005
(0.0005)*** (0.0003) (0.0010)** (0.0010)
Interactions with "After" indicator:
Tariff rate 0.0018 0.0002 -0.0138 -0.0118
(0.0058) (0.0021) (0.0109) (0.0127)
Log import volume 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0081 -0.0074
(0.0090) (0.0032) (0.0183) (0.0188)
(Tariff rate)*(Log import volume) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0009 0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Country-product group fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Month fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Num. of obs.: 11,303 11,303 11,303 11,303
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Each column of table presents coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from a separate weighted least squares estimation. Standard errors 
clustered by country. Unit of observation is imports in a country/product-group cell in a particular month. Tariff rate variable is simple average 1989 tariff 
across all individual items in the Harmonized System (1988 version) section. Import volume variable is log of mean monthly imports in the before period in the 
Harmonized System section. See Table 2 for other notes.
Dependent variable:  Fraction of imports …
tables  heteffectTable 5: Implications of minimum value threshold reduction for Philippine customs revenue
During after period (Dec 1990 - Feb 1992)
Revenue gains
21,912,359 $             
Avoided inspection fees due to:
Shifts to valuation under $500 1,248,377 $               
Shifts to export processing zones 1,445,303 $               
Gross revenue gains 24,606,039 $             
Revenue losses
28,043,775 $             
Loss of import duties due to:
Shifts to valuation under $500 49,303 $                    
Shifts to export processing zones 33,279,394 $             
Gross revenue losses 61,372,472 $             
Net revenue gain (loss) (36,766,434) $           
Addendum: Inputs to calculations
Total imports from PSI countries in after period  $       6,935,429,990 
Weighted average tariff, 1992 (3) 17.8%
Percentage-point increase in true value reported for shipments $500-$5000 90%
Reduction in minimum value threshold smuggling as share of PSI-country imports (5) -0.016
Increase in valuation under $500 as share of PSI-country imports (5) 0.0004
Increase in shipments to export processing zones as share of PSI-country imports (5) 0.027
Assumed original value of shipments under $500 500.00 $                    
PSI fee as percentage of declared shipment value 0.6%
Minimum charge per inspection 225.00 $                    
PSI fee as % of declared value of export processing zone shipments (6) 0.77%
Total number of shipments from PSI countries valued between $500 and $5,000 (2) 124,639                     
Fraction of value underreported solely due to avoidance of PSI via origin switching (4) 10.0%
NOTES to Addendum--
(2) From Dec 1990 - Feb 1992.
(3) Weights are imports by HS section from Dec 1990 - Feb 1992. Tariff data is from 1992 UNCTAD Trains dataset (1991 data unavailable). 
(4) Conservative assumptions.
(5) From relevant row of Table 2.
Increase in import duties due to reduction in minimum value threshold smuggling
Additional inspection fees for shipments valued between $500 and $5,000
(6) Inferred PSI fees divided by total value of shipments, between Dec 1990 and Feb 1992. PSI fees inferred using distribution of shipments by size 
under this shipment type and PSI fee structure (0.6% of declared value, with $225 minimum charge per shipment).
NOTE -- Figures are in nominal US$. See Appendix for explanation of details behind calculation, and below for inputs to calculations.
tables  revenue implic calcAppendix Table 1: Changes in Philippine preshipment inspection (PSI) program
Date Countries added to 
program
Minimum value threshold 
for inspection
April 1, 1987 Hong Kong $5,000 
  (start of program) Japan
Taiwan






May 2, 1990 Macau Lowered to $2,500
November 1, 1990 Lowered to $500
March 16, 1992 All remaining 
countries
NOTE-- Shipments with invoiced value below minimum value threshold are not 
required to undergo preshipment inspection.
tables  timelineAppendix Table 2: Displacement of treatment-country imports to alternative duty-avoidance methods
(Data aggregated to country level)
(Weighted least squares estimates)
Before period: Nov 1989 - Apr 1990. After period: Dec 1990 - Feb 1992.
A. Basic difference-in-difference estimate
…between $5000 
and $500
…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
(Treatment country)*(After) -0.024 0.0007 0.035 0.012
(0.008)*** (0.001) (0.014)** (0.018)
"Treatment country" indicator 0.035 -0.003 -0.001 0.031
(0.012)*** (0.005) (0.012) (0.017)*
"After" indicator 0.007 -0.0003 0.004 0.01
(0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.02 0.0056 0.048 0.074
(0.004)*** (0.005) (0.010)*** (0.013)***
R-squared 0.04 0 0.03 0.03
Number of observations 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466
B. Detailed country and month fixed effects
…between $5000 
and $500
…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
(Treatment country)*(After) -0.023 0.0028 0.035 0.014
(0.008)*** (0.003) (0.015)** (0.019)
Country fixed effects YYY Y
Month fixed effects YYY Y
R-squared 0.23 0.48 0.45 0.47
Number of observations 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Notes to Table 2 apply, except as follows. Unit of observation is imports at the origin country level in a given month. Each observation 
weighted by mean monthly imports (by value) in before period (Nov 1989 to Apr 1990) for specific country. Standard errors clustered by country.
Dependent variable: Fraction of imports …
Dependent variable: Fraction of imports …
tables  aggdataAppendix Table 3: Impact of enforcement on total imports from treatment and control countries
(Weighted least squares estimates)
Before period: Nov 1989 - Apr 1990. After period: Dec 1990 - Feb 1992.
Dependent variable: Ln(total value of imports)
(a) (b)
(Treatment country)*(After) 0.124 0.097
(0.142) (0.112)






Country fixed effects -Y
Month fixed effects -Y
R-squared 0.01 0.87
Number of observations 11,303 11,303
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Notes to Table 2 apply, except that dependent variable is natural log of total imports (in current US$) in the country/product-group cell in the 
given month.
tables  importsAppendix Table 4: Displacement of treatment-country imports to alternative duty-avoidance methods
('False experiment' in pre-period)
(Weighted least squares estimates)
False before period: Nov 1988 - Apr 1989. False after period: Nov 1989 - Apr 1990.




…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
Ln(total value of 
imports)
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
(Treatment country)*(After) 0.000 -0.0039 -0.007 -0.011 -0.029
(0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.158)
"Treatment country" indicator 0.03 0.005 0.005 0.04 0.353
(0.013)** (0.006) (0.017) (0.023)* (0.674)
"After" indicator -0.009 -0.0009 0.016 0.005 0.473
(0.002)*** (0.0005)* (0.013) (0.013) (0.114)***
Constant 0.035 0.003 0.034 0.072 15.329
(0.006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.014)** (0.020)*** (0.438)***
R-squared 0.04 0 0 0.02 0.02
Number of observations 5,934 5,934 5,934 5,934 5,934




…under $500 ...destined for 
export processing 
zone
...in any of the 
previous three 
categories
Ln(total value of 
imports)
(a) (b) (c)  (a)+(b)+(c)
(Treatment country)*(After) 0.000 -0.0038 -0.002 -0.006 -0.086
(0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.167)
Country/product-group fixed effects YYY Y Y
Month fixed effects YYY Y Y
R-squared 0.48 0.21 0.64 0.59 0.84
Number of observations 5,934 5,934 5,934 5,934 5,934
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: Fraction of imports …
Dependent variable: Fraction of imports …
NOTES-- All notes to Table 2 apply, except that "Before" indicates that observation occurs in Nov 1988 - Apr 1989, and "After" indicates that observation occurs in Nov 
1989 - Apr 1990.








































NOTE-- Figure displays graphs of equation (1) in text. τ= 0.15 and M=1 for all curves. For 

















































































































































































Treatment countries Control countries
NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports by value entering in shipments valued between $2,500 and $5,000 in 
the given month, from treatment (PSI) countries and from control (non-PSI) countries. Treatment countries are 
Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. All other 
countries are control countries. Shipments in overlapping shipment types (e.g., shipment is both "under $500" and 
"destined for export processing zone") are allocated to the low-value types (either "between $5000 and $500" or 
"under $500"). Data source: shipment database of the National Statistics Office of the Philippines.
Figure 2: Fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued between 




































































































































































































































































































































































Treatment countries Control countries
NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued between $500 and $2,500 in the given 
month, by country group. For all other notes, see Figure 2.
Figure 3: Fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued between $500 
and $2,500 (November 1988 – February 1992)
NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued below $500 in the given month, by 
country group. For all other notes, see Figure 2.
Figure 4: Fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued below $500 













































































Treatment countries Control countries
NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports destined for export processing zones in the given month, by country 
group. Data are smoothed to reduce noise (each data point is a three-month centered moving average). For all other 
notes, see Figure 2.
Figure 5: Fraction of total imports destined for export processing zones 
(January 1989 – February 1992)
Min. val. 
threshold 
lowered to 
$2,500
Min. val. 
threshold 
lowered to 
$500
Min. val. 
threshold is 
$5,000